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Abstract
The results of a learning process depend on the input data.
There are cases in which an adversary can strategically tam-
per with the input data to affect the outcome of the learn-
ing process. While some datasets are difficult to attack, many
others are susceptible to manipulation. A resourceful attacker
can tamper with large portions of the dataset and affect them.
An attacker can additionally strategically focus on a preferred
subset of the attributes in the dataset to maximize the effec-
tiveness of the attack and minimize the resources allocated to
data manipulation. In light of this vulnerability, we introduce
a solution according to which the defender implements an ar-
ray of learners, and their activation is performed strategically.
The defender computes the (game theoretic) strategy space
and accordingly applies a dominant strategy where possible,
and a Nash-stable strategy otherwise. In this paper we provide
the details of this approach. We analyze Nash equilibrium in
such a strategic learning environment, and demonstrate our
solution by specific examples.
Introduction
Nowadays, machine learning algorithms are widely used in
commercial applications. Many of these algorithms rely on
datasets in which data is provided from external sources,
over which the application and its owners have little control.
Given that the results of a learning process depend on the
input data, an adversary can strategically tamper with the in-
put data to affect the outcome of the learning process to meet
its preference. Commonly, learners assume that the dataset
is large enough and that manipulations against the dataset
are too small to allow significant changes in the learning
outcomes. However, these assumptions do not always hold.
In practice, some datasets are rather small and therefore are
inherently susceptible to manipulation. Yet, larger datasets
are vulnerable too, as a resourceful attacker can invest the
needed resources to tamper sufficiently large portions of the
dataset and affect them as well. Further, an attacker can
strategically focus on a preferred subset of the attributes in
the detaset to maximize the effectiveness of the attack and
minimize the resources allocated to data manipulation.
In light of this vulnerability, machine learning solutions
can be applied such that, instead of implementing a single
learner, several learners will be implemented. These learners
can execute concurrently and their results can be compared.
Alternatively, the learning solution can implement some pol-
icy of switching between those learners. Such learners typ-
ically apply different processing procedures on the dataset.
These may in turn focus on different subsets of the attributes
in the detaset. Nevertheless, as long as the underlying dis-
tribution of the dataset does not change, the results of the
learning should be similar across learners. Once the dataset
is tampered and the distribution changes, learners’ results
may vary. This variation is an opportunity for an attacker,
but as we demonstrate in is this paper it can also serve for
improved defense against such attacks.
In a nutshell, we suggest that the defender will implement
an array of learners, however their activation will be per-
formed strategically. The defender will compute the strat-
egy space (for both attacker and defender) and will accord-
ingly apply a dominant strategy where possible, and a Nash-
stable strategy otherwise. In what follows, we provide de-
tails of this approach. We analyze Nash equilibrium in such
strategic learning environments and provide specific exam-
ples thereof.
Model assumptions
Our model entails a dataset (that serves as the training set
for our learner) with n attributes, A = {1, . . . , n}. In ad-
dition, we assume a partition of A into k disjoint subsets
B1, . . . , Bk, ∀i 6= j, Bi ∩ Bj = ∅, ∪iBi = A. We further
assume that attributes within a subset Bi represent, loosely
speaking, correlation in the data, and that attributes in dis-
joint subsets Bi, Bj , i 6= j are not correlated.
Select a learner l that is to be defended. Denote an
attribute selected by the learner from an attribute subset
Bx by al(x). We assume that, for any x ∈ {1, . . . , k},
when the learner selects an attribute al(x) ∈ Bx and
uses (al(x))x∈{1,...k} for learning, the learning results will
be similar regardless of the specific (al(x))x∈{1,...k}. We
experimentally validate the assumption that there exists a
learner for which similar learning results are derived inde-
pendently of the specific choice of x ∈ {1, . . . , k}, as de-
scribed in Section Validity of model assumptions.
Denote an attribute selected by an adversary for an at-
tribute subset By by aa(y). In our model learners and ad-
versaries select attributes. Learners use them for learning,
and adversaries use them to attack the learning. Later in this
paper we discuss the relationship between the two parties.
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Tampering with learning attributes
As stated earlier, in our model learners and adversaries select
attributes. We assume that an adversary selects an attribute
and modifies it to harm the learning process. The adversary
repeats her choice for each element in the division of A, Bi,
thus obtaining a vector of k choices, (aa(i))aa(i)∈Bi . We
view the interaction between the learner and the adversary
as a zero sum game in which the learner’s pure strategies
are all possible vectors of choices of the type (al(i))al(i)∈Bi
and the adversary’s pure strategies are all possible vectors of
choices (aa(i))aa(i)∈Bi . In this game, when an adversary’s
choice is equal to the learner’s choice, (i.e., al(i) = aa(i)),
we perceive it as a success of the adversary, and the learner
pays the adversary 1 (or any other agreed upon uniform
sum). When summing over all elements of the strategy vec-
tors of the two players, the learner pays the adversary, in total∑
i∈{1,...,k} I(al(i), aa(i)), where I(x, y) is the identity in-
dicator function, whose value is 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise.
Assuming the learner and attacker choose al(i) and aa(i)
respectively at random, the payment is:∑
i∈{1,...k}
(
1
|Bi| )
2|Bi| =
∑
i∈{1,...,k}
1
|Bi| (1)
These strategies of random choice of attributes are in Nash
equilibrium.
To see that, assume the adversary chooses a specific
aa(i)aa(i)∈Bi , i = 1, . . . , k, then the average payment for
each Bi will be 1|Bi| . As a result, the overall payment of the
learner to the adversary is again
∑
i∈{1,...,k}
1
|Bi| and the ad-
versary does not gain from changing to a pure strategy. The
same applies for the learner and thus the players are at Nash
equilibrium when randomly choosing an attribute for each
division element.
Illustration of game definition
We are given four attributes {1, 2, 3, 4}. The learner chooses
an attribute from {1, 2} and an attribute from {3, 4} to learn
from. The attacker chooses an attribute from {1, 2} and
an attribute from {3, 4} to modify and harm the learning
process. If the attack is {1}, {3} and the learner chooses
{2}, {3}, the learner pays the attacker 1 as one attribute,
namely {3}, was tampered with and used in learning. If the
learner and the attacker choose their attributes at random,
the payment on average is 2(1/2)(1/2)+ 2(1/2)(1/2) = 1.
Note that the attacker cannot improve, as if she plays some
pure strategy, say {1, 3}, she will get the same payment,
namely, 1/2 + 1/2 = 1. The same applies to the learner.
An example
We are given data that adheres to the following rule
{x, 2x, y, 2y}. Thus, the correlated sets in this case are
B1 = {x, 2x}, B2 = {y, 2y}. The function to be learned
is f(x, y) = x + y. If the learner chooses to focus on x
and on y, she learns an approximation of x + y with good
probability. If she chooses 2x, 2y she learns an approxima-
tion of 12x +
1
2y with good probability, and so on. Suppose
that, when the adversary chooses an attribute u, it changes it
to u2. If both of players play the Nash equilibrium strategy
mentioned above, the average payment of the learner to the
adversary, according to equation 1, is 2 × 14 + 2 × 14 = 1.
Some patterns of data corruption that may result from the ad-
versary’s attack are ((2x)2, (2y)2) if both choose (2x, 2y) or
(x, (2y)2) if the adversary chooses (2x, 2y) and the learner
chose (x, 2y).
A one feature attack
Many per feature attacks are possible. In this section we de-
tail a possible attack to make the notion of feature attack
concrete. We assume a binary classification problem. One
class is denoted by + and the other by −. We focus on one
feature x, taking values inR. We assume some density func-
tion f+(x) for the + class and similarly f−(x) for the −,
with averages u+ and u− respectively. We also assume that
data is generated by ”nature” choosing with equal probabil-
ity the class − or + and then choosing a value x using the
appropriate probability density (f+(x) if + was chosen and
f−(x) if − was chosen).
Assume u− < u+. If u+ and u− are far apart the learner
chooses x for the learning. The objective of the adversary is
to bring u+ and u− closer together assuming they are known
to the adversary. The adversary chooses some density, fa(x)
with average u = u−+u+2 and designs the following attack.
She chooses x using the density fa(x); with probability 2
she labels it +; with the same probability 2 she labels it
with −; otherwise, she lets nature choose x.
Assuming the label is +, the new average when the at-
tack is taking place
∫
x[ 1−2 f+(x)+

2fa(x)]2dx is equal to
2[ 1−2 u++

2u] which amounts to (1−)u++u. So u+ was
moved closer to u− as a result of the attack by (u+ − u).
A similar effect applies to u−. Thus, as a result of the attack
the feature x will appear less desirable to the learner and,
consequently, may not be chosen for the learning.
Validity of model assumptions
In Section Model assumptions it was assumed that, given a
dataset of features and its partitioning into Bis, any choice
of a feature from each Bi and a learning method that uses
the chosen features results in comparable performance. In
this section we present experimental results that validate that
assumption. For such validation, it is sufficient to show in-
stances in which such Bi grouping exists. The dataset used
to prove the validity of the presented model is the fash-
ion MNIST (Zalando-Research 2017) dataset, comprised of
28x28 gray-scale images of 70,000 fashion products from 10
categories. The learning method used is Support Vector Ma-
chine, SVM (Cortes and Vapnik 1995). In the control experi-
ment, 1000 images were selected randomly from the dataset,
from which 800 were used to train the model and the remain-
ing 200 were used to test the model. Under the assumptions
mentioned above, the model yielded 0.786±0.030 accuracy
rate. A model will be considered comparable if it has accu-
racy rate within that range for the same data.
We then used a partitioning method to generateB groups.
We have generated multiple partitions into B groups, where
the number of groups was sequentially varied from 2 (k = 2)
Figure 1: Example of partitioning with k = 20
to 784 (k = 784). In the case of 784 groups, each B group
consisted of a single feature. For each partitioning k we have
executed a learning experiment, and the summary of the re-
sults of all of those experiments is presented in Figure 2. For
each specific k partitioning, for each group Bx of features
in that partition, one feature was selected at random (al(x)).
Thus, a group (al(x))x∈{1,...,k} of size k was created for
each partition k for each one of the images.
An example of such partitioning can be seen in Figure
1. In the figure, a partitioning of k = 20 can be seen, in
which each color represents a different B1≤i≤k. The pixels
of each image Sj , 1 ≤ j ≤ 1000, both in the training set
and in the testing set, are partitioned as described into k =
20 groups. For each image Sj and from each group Bi of
pixels (features) in Sj , a random pixel p<j,i> is chosen. To
sum up, for each image Sj , we generate a 20 pixels abstract
image S20j = {p<j,1>, . . . , p<j,20>}. The original label of
Sj is kept as S20j ’s label. The output of this process is 1000
abstracted images S20j and their associated labels.
The process applied to the example as described above is
repeated for each k ∈ {2, . . . , 784}. The result is a reduc-
tion from raw images of 784 pixels, each corresponding to a
feature, to abstracted images Skj of k features each. Each ab-
stracted image Skj is associated with the original label. The
abstracted images Skj are used to train and test a model in
the same fashion used in the control experiment.
The results of the experiments for all k partitionings are
summarized in a chart in Figure 2, where for each value of
k the accuracy in predicting the test group was recorded.
In Figure 2 one can clearly observe that, from k ≈ 200
the learning is comparable to the control experiment. In the
range k ∈ {250, . . . , 300} the accuracy of the model is
Figure 2: Accuracy as a function of K using SVM as a
learner
0.77 ± 0.013, well inside the range of the accuracy of the
control experiment, and therefore it can be considered com-
parable. Thus, the assumptions on the model prove valid.
While the existence of a single learner for which compa-
rable learning applies as above is enough to validate the as-
sumptions of the model, there are more than a single learner
that meet the model assumptions. Specifically, we have ap-
plied the same abstraction process to several classifying al-
gorithms. In Figure 3 we present the results for Decision
Tree as a learner. One can observe an accuracy pattern that
is very similar to the pattern observed for SVM. Specifically,
the range 200 ≤ k ≤ 300 gives comparable learning.
Figure 3: Accuracy as a function of K using Decision Tree
as a learner
Related work
In recent years, the interest in adversarial machine learning
increases rapidly. For instance, taxonomy and classification
of attacks against online learners are provided in (Huang et
al. 2011). That study additionally discusses the capabilities
of the adversaries and their limitation. Our research builds
upon such studies that have identified and classified the vul-
nerabilities, and we propose a solution that addresses one of
those.
The use of game theory to address security and privacy
problems is not new. As suggested in (Manshaei et al. 2013),
strategic decision making can deliver better security com-
pared to the non-strategic case. In line with work performed
in the field of security, we also adopt game theoretic anal-
ysis and strategic decision making. Yet, in difference from
that work, we apply our analysis to learners and to the at-
tributes comprising the dataset they aim to learn from. As
a result, our equilibrium strategies differ. It is important to
note that some variations of the game we study may require
different analysis such as, e.g., Stackelberg equilibrium anal-
ysis. For example, in (Sengupta, Chakraborti, and Kamb-
hampati 2018), Stackelberg equilibrium based analysis for
Deep Neural Networks was presented.
Another somewhat similar field of research in which game
theoretic analysis was performed is the field of intrusion de-
tection. As demonstrated in (Cavusoglu and Raghunathan
2004), configuration detection can be optimized using game
theoretic analysis performed by firms. In our study, the game
theoretic analysis does not examine configuration, and the
aim is for automated learners to act strategically, and not for
firms to do that. Nevertheless, the analysis has many simi-
larities.
Network security games are another example in which
game theory is harnessed to facilitate improved security
(Christin 2011). There, the focus is not on Nash equilibrium
analysis, unlike our case in which Nash is central.
Conclusion
While this is a study in its early stages, it has already deliv-
ered important insights into the preferred strategic behavior
of learners in the context of adversarial machine learning.
Specifically, our analysis indicates that, when the learner can
select from among several learning methods, its best strategy
is to randomly switch between those methods. This strategy
results in a Nash equilibrium, hence the learner has no in-
centive to deviate (as long as the adversary does not deviate
either). Applying a uniform probability in such a case is sen-
sible as long as all methods perform equally well. If this is
not the case, weights can be used to express the difference
between the methods. Note that the random selection among
methods and the switching from one method to the other
makes much sense regardless of the Nash equilibrium. This
is because it provides the learner with the ability to ”hide”
from the attacker, and to change its ”location” to increase
the difficulty to attack and reduce the chances of its success.
Our approach can be extended in several ways. Firstly, not
all players are rational decision makers. This implies that it
is not guaranteed that the adversary plays the Nash strate-
gies. Therefore, it could be beneficial for the learner to learn
its adversary’s strategy and devise a best-response strategy.
Such best response can increase the success of the learner in
avoiding attacks. Secondly, there may be cases of more than
one attacker. In such cases, the Nash analysis presented here
will not suffice, and further analysis is required. Thirdly, the
assumption that the adversary knows the attributes available
for learning by the learner does not always hold. In such
cases the attacker may apply some guessing. It should be
useful to study such cases and find the best learner’s strate-
gies for them as well.
In summary, we have shown that attacks against learning
can be mitigated via careful design of strategic selection of
learning methods and attributes. We believe that this study
should lead to a plethora of strategic learning defense mech-
anisms.
Diversity in learning values
In this section we modify the model to capture different
quality of learning results and consequences of attacking
them.
As before our model entails a dataset (that serves as
the training set for our learner) with n attributes, A =
{1, . . . , n}. In addition, we assume a partition of A into
k disjoint subsets B1, . . . , Bk, ∀i 6= j, Bi ∩ Bj = ∅,
∪iBi = A. We further assume that attributes within a sub-
set Bi represent, loosely speaking, correlation in the data,
and that attributes in disjoint subsets Bi, Bj , i 6= j are not
correlated.
Denote an attribute selected by a learner from an attribute
subsetBx by al(x). We assume that, for any x ∈ {1, . . . , k},
when the learner selects an attribute al(x) ∈ Bx and uses
(al(x))x∈{1,...k} for learning, the quality of the learning re-
sult isQ(al(x))x∈{1,...k}). The quality of the learning varies
as a function of the attribute choices of the learner.
Denote an attribute selected by an adversary for an at-
tribute subset By by aa(y). As before, learners and adver-
saries select attributes. Learners use them for learning, and
adversaries use them to attack the learning. Below we dis-
cuss the relationship between the two parties.
As before, we assume that an adversary selects an at-
tribute and modifies it to harm the learning process. The ad-
versary repeats her choice for each element in the division of
A, Bi, thus obtaining a vector of k choices, (aa(i))aa(i)∈Bi .
We view the interaction between the learner and the ad-
versary as a zero sum game in which the learner’s pure
strategies are all possible vectors of choices of the type
(al(i))al(i)∈Bi and the adversary’s pure strategies are all
possible vectors of choices (aa(i))aa(i)∈Bi . In this game,
when an adversary’s choice is equal to the learner’s choice,
(i.e., al(i) = aa(i)), we perceive it as a success of the ad-
versary. The set of all possible pure strategies of the learner
is denoted by L and the set of all possible pure strategies of
the attacker is denoted byAT . We assume a reward function
R : L×AT → < that determines the payment of the learner
to the attacker and meets the following assumptions.
1. For a given strategy pair, al, aa, if there is at least one Bi
for which al(i) = aa(i) then Q(al) < R(al, aa).
2. Otherwise Q(al) = R(al, aa)
We obtained a zero sum game which has a Nash equilib-
rium. Note that the number of pure strategies is p =
∏ |Bi|,
for both the attacker and learner. Thus, if the simplex algo-
rithm is applied the worst run time is O(p3).
For a given learner, al, over time we may observe decreas-
ing quality of learning attributed to the attacks. This can be
used to feedback reward function values to our model and
solve the game for best learning. TBC
Another extension of the model takes into account the
fact that an ML algorithm performance is best modeled
as a random variable. Thus, the quality of the ML algo-
rithm is best viewed as an expected confidence interval
I = [Q(al) − ,Q(al) + ]. The confidence interval repre-
sents the expected quality of the ML algorithm at deploy-
ment time. Following this rationale, attacks that obtain a
reward function R(al, aa) ∈ I fail as they do not change
the expected operational quality of the ML algorithm. Oth-
erwise, the attack succeeds.
A fundamental additional step in the modeling that ig-
nores other aspects of the players utility and focuses on the
impact on the learning is to model the reward function us-
ing the performance of the learner under attack. Denote by
Q(al, aa) the average quality of the learning algorithm ob-
tained with the features al under the attack aa. We then
model the reward function asR(al, aa) = Q(al)+(Q(al)−
Q(al, aa)).
We assume the following:
1. For a given strategy pair, al, aa, if there is at least one Bi
for which al(i) = aa(i) then Q(al, aa) < Q(al).
2. Otherwise Q(al, aa) = Q(al)
It is easy to show that the obtained function R(al, aa) =
Q(al)+ (Q(al)−Q(al, aa)) is indeed a function that meets
the reward function assumptions. Note that for clarity we
could have consider R(al, aa) ← R(al, aa) − Q(al) as the
utility is invariant under affine transformation.
• For accuracy the success of the attack is not symmetrical.
If the accuracy increases as a result of the attack it is prob-
ably good for the learner. Thus, a symmetric definition is
not the right definition
• The learning Q(al, aa) is a random variable by itself
which may lead to another definition of the above success
or failure of the attack.
Social security example
To illustrate the problem of adversarial attack against learn-
ers, consider the following social security case. A social
security service provides monetary support to people in
need based on some support criteria. Once the criteria are
met, support eligibility are established. For example, sup-
port criteria may include taxable income and home own-
ership, which are typically correlated. The social security
service holds historical information about eligible and inel-
igible populations. From these data it can learn a model of
eligibility and apply it to new support candidates to assist in
eligibility determination.
An example of an adversary may be an intermediary office
that represents social security support candidates with their
case to help them gain the desired support. Suppose this of-
fice charges a fee for success in gaining the desired support.
Given that the office aims to maximize its gains, it is in its
best interest to increase the expected number of support ap-
provals. One possible way for doing that is by affecting the
eligibility model of the social security service. This can be
done by affecting the data held by the service.
The learning process includes two stages, namely, feature
selection and the application of the learning algorithm. In
our case, features such as home ownership and family size
may be negatively correlated while home ownership and in-
come may be positively correlated. In our models, the cor-
related features may belong to the same partition. During
the feature selection process only one of the correlated fea-
tures may be selected and feed to the learning algorithm.
This may be done to obtain a good relation between the size
of the training data the number of features and the data and
may increase the quality of the generalization obtained by
the algorithm. While from a learning perspective any of the
correlated features may be chosen, an adversary may take
advantage of the fact that, for example, house ownership was
chosen in the feature selection phase and tamper with that
parameter. Thus it is desirable for the learner to randomize
on the correlated features that reside in the same partition as
analyzed in .
Tampering with the historical (training) data may consist
of modifying the values of one of the features such that the
model will classify some of the new records that were pre-
viously ineligible, as eligible. For example, such tampering
can result in the model learning that higher income individ-
uals are eligible for social security support.
Time series attack
Another model may be designed to capture time series at-
tacks on the derivative, focusing on modifying the optimal
span of the non-parametric derivative of the time series.
Such a derivative is used to estimate, e.g., the future traffic
load on an edge in a Waze type scenario.
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